I study optimal allocations in versions of the Trejos-Wright [1995] and Shi [1995] models with indivisible money and bounded individual holdings. The objective is expected discounted utility and the feasible set consists of all distributions of money holdings and trades in meetings which are mutually consistent and ex post individually rational. This problem is described in Deviatov and Wallace [2001], who study the e¤ects of money creation in that model. Although they show that money creation can be helpful, they do not describe optima because their problem is not …nite dimensional. Here I show, under a mild additional restriction on the set of allocations, that the optimum has no randomization over output and, therefore, that the feasible set can be limited to a …nite dimensional space.
Introduction
I study optimal stationary allocations in versions of the Trejos-Wright [5] and Shi [4] models with indivisible money and bounded individual holdings. This is a random matching model of money with perishable and divisible produced goods and, in the versions I study, no double coincidences in pairwise meetings. The objective in the optimum problem is expected discounted utility, the expectation taken over the steady-state distribution of money holdings. The feasible set in the optimum problem consists of all possible stationary distributions of money holdings and trades in meetings -actually distributions of trades in meetings because randomization is allowed -which are mutually consistent and are ex post individually rational in meetings. Here, and this is crucial, ex post means that I require that each element in the support of any randomization scheme for the meeting be individually rational. In other words, I assume here that people in a meeting cannot commit to randomization in a meeting. My goal is to show that the optimum does not involve randomization over output in the following sense: conditional on the realization for the amount of money to be transferred in a meeting from the consumer to the producer, there is no randomization over output.
I came upon this issue through the study of the maximizing rate of lumpsum money creation in that model. The model is interesting for the study of such money creation because it gives rise to a potential trade-o¤. On the one hand, money creation is harmful for the usual reason that shows up in representative-agent models: money creation makes the acquisition of money less desirable. On the other hand, money creation is bene…cial because it can redistribute money toward average holdings so that people on average in meetings are more willing to trade. In his Ph.D. dissertation, Miguel Molico [3] studied money creation in the same model with, he claimed, divisible money and unbounded individual holdings. Although that claim is not literally true because he proceeds numerically, he does …nd examples in which money creation is bene…cial. However, he studies only allocations in which the trades are the result of take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by consumers. Because such trades are known to cause too much production in some meetings, some of the bene…cial e¤ects that he …nds may come from o¤setting the sub-optimal way of dividing the gains from trade.
In some previous work [2] , done jointly with Neil Wallace, we wanted to determine whether money creation would have a role even if we allowed trades in meetings -the division of the gains from trade in meetings -to be determined optimally from the point of view of ex ante welfare. To do that, we imposed only the restrictions noted above -ex post individual rationality in meetings. We allowed randomization and established the following result analytically: for indivisible money and individual holdings limited to the set f0; 1; 2g and for all discount factors higher than a critical value, some money creation could raise ex ante welfare relative to the best allocation without money creation. 1 Our argument was local and we did not explore the tradeo¤ described above. Indeed, the critical value of the discount factor is such that locally there is no harmful e¤ect of money creation.
We could not explore the trade-o¤ or even describe optima for examples because we did not know that output is degenerate in the sense described above. In the absence of any such result, the optimization problem is in…nite dimensional even for the above small set of individual holdings. My result makes this problem …nite dimensional, and, therefore, opens the way to exploration of the trade-o¤ between harmful and bene…cial e¤ects of money creation in that model. That is important because it is evident that the optimum always has harmful e¤ects -making it seem from the point of view of someone who ignores distribution e¤ects that there is too much money creation.
One conceivable approach to establishing degeneracy is to replace any nondegenerate distribution over output by its mean. While this would increase the objective, because it is concave, it is not evident how to show that such a non-local alternative also satis…es ex post individual rationality. Therefore, I develop a local argument. First, I devise a way to perturb distributions in terms of a few parameters. The perturbation adjusts the endpoints of the support and creates an atom or adjusts any that exist. Second, in order to carry out the perturbations and to invoke the Kuhn-Tucker theorem's necessary conditions, the allocations under consideration have to be internal. This requirement forces me to consider a subset of allocations, those I call connected. Because this is a proper subset of all ex post individually rational allocations, I also have to argue that it is plausible that the optimum over the larger set is in fact connected.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the environment is set out in the next section; the optimum problem is de…ned in section 3; the connectedness restriction is discussed in section 4; and the main results are in section 5.
Environments
Time is discrete and the horizon is in…nite. There are N¸3 perishable consumption goods at each date and a [0; 1] continuum of each of N types of agents. A type n person consumes only good n and produces good n + 1 (modulo N ). Each person maximizes expected discounted utility with discount parameter¯2 (0; 1). Utility in a period is given by u(y)¡c(x), where y denotes consumption and x denotes production of an individual (x; y 2 R + ). The function u is strictly concave, strictly increasing and satis…es u(0) = 0, while the function c is convex with c(0) = 0 and is strictly increasing. Also, there existsŷ > 0 such that u(ŷ) = c(ŷ). In addition, u and c are twice continuously di¤erentiable. At each date, each agent meets one other person at random.
There is only one asset in this economy which can be stored across periods: …at money. This money is indivisible and no individual can have more than B units of money at any given time, where 2 · B < 1. Agents cannot commit to future actions, including commitment to outcomes of randomized trades in meetings. Finally, each agent's specialization type and individual money holdings are observable within each meeting, but the agent's history, except as revealed by money holdings, is private.
Implementable allocations and the optimum problem
The pairwise meetings, the inability to commit, the privacy of individual histories, and the perishable nature of the goods imply that any production must be accompanied by a transfer of money. In every meeting of a potential producer with i units of money and a potential consumer with j units, there is a set, denoted K ij , of feasible money transfers from the consumer to the producer, transfers which are consistent with each person's money holdings being in the set f0; 1; :::; Bg: K ij = f0; 1; ::: min(j; B ¡ i)g. A trade meeting is one where K ij is at least as rich as f0; 1g set. For each trade meeting between a producer with i and a consumer with j units of money, trade is represented by a probability measure ¹ ij on R + £ K ij with the interpretation that if (y; k) is randomly drawn in accordance with ¹ ij , then (y; k) is the suggested trade in that meeting. For any measure ¹ ij it is convenient to consider the collection of conditional measures ¹ k ij (A) = ¹ ij (A j k), k 2 K ij , and their supports k ij .
2 Then ¹ ij can be expressed as
, is the probability that k units of money are o¤ered in a meeting. Finally, let p i be the fraction of agents in each specialization type who start a date with i units of money and let p = (p 0 ; :::; p B ). Then, in terms of p i and¸k ij , an arbitrary o¤-diagonal element of the transition matrix T for p is given by:
where ¼ mn is the probability of a trade that results in transition from having m units of money to having n units. Note that since T is a transition matrix, its diagonal elements are given by
It is convenient to express individual rationality constraints in terms of discounted expected utilities. For an allocation (p; ¹), where ¹ is a stationary collection of measures ¹ ij , (i; j) 2 f0; :::; B ¡ 1g £ f1; :::; Bg, discounted expected utility of an agent who ends up with i units of money after trade, denoted v i ; is constant. Then vector v´(v 0 ; :::; v B ) satis…es the following B + 1-equation system of Bellman equations:
where q, the vector of (expected) one period returns from trade, is given by:
and where l 2 f0; :::; Bg. Note that an individual with no money can only expect to be a producer, an agent with B units can only be a consumer, and anyone else can be either a consumer or a producer.
Because T is a transition matrix and¯2 (0; 1), the mapping G(x)( q 0 + T x 0 ) is a contraction. Therefore, (2) has a unique solution which can be expressed as
where I is the (B + 1) £ (B + 1) identity matrix.
The ex post notion of individual rationality gives rise to the following de…nition:
(ii) v is non-decreasing, and (iii) p i p j > 0 and (y; k) 2 supp ¹ ij imply:
De…nition 1 says that an allocation is implementable if it is stationary, satis…es free disposal of money and if the ex post gains from trade implied by the allocation are nonnegative. Finally, our optimum problem is to maximize ex ante utility. That is, the optimum problem, denoted P , is to choose (p; ¹) from among those that are implementable to maximize pv
0´W

:
It is useful to express the objective W in terms of returns. If I multiply (2) by p and use the fact that pT = p; then I obtain:
Then, by writing out the product pq 0 , I get:
where z(y)´u(y) ¡ c(y). As one would expect, because for every consumer there is a producer, welfare is equal to the net expected discounted utility in all trade meetings.
Connectedness of an allocation
The main objective of this paper is to show that degeneracy of the measures ¹ k ij holds for solutions to problem P . However, I cannot work with problem P directly. As I said, I use an argument which is based on perturbations of candidates for the optima. To apply that method, I need the candidates to be internal because otherwise they can not be perturbed and remain implementable. To assure satisfaction of this condition, I consider a subset of implementable allocations -those that satisfy a property I call connectedness.
The formal de…nition of connectedness is somewhat lengthy and may be di¢cult to follow at …rst. Roughly speaking, it requires that an allocation implies a value function consistent with a willingness to trade one unit of money in a su¢cient number of meetings. Here willingness does not require that actual trades involve transfers of one unit of money, but only that trades of one unit satisfy the participation constraints implied by the allocation. A su¢cient number of meetings means that these meetings can be linked into a chain that covers the entire set of money holdings. Here, by describing simple su¢cient conditions for connectedness, I suggest that adding the connectedness requirement is likely to be innocuous for problem P .
Given the form of the objective (see (6)), one would expect that any solutions to problem P would have trade in many meetings. But, requiring trade in all trade meetings is too restrictive; it may be hard to get trades between poor consumers and rich producers. Fortunately, that is not necessary for connectedness. Instead, the following is su¢cient: (i) (p; ¹) has full support and implies a concave value function v; and (ii) trade occurs in all meetings where the consumer is at least as rich as the producer. 3 It is plausible that solutions to problem P satisfy (i) and (ii) and, hence, are connected. 4 I now turn to the formal de…nition of connectedness. Let (p; ¹) be an arbitrary allocation. Let G (p;¹) be the set of all pairs (i; j), i being the producer's holdings and j the consumer's holdings, such that agents are willing 3 The proof that these conditions are su¢cient for connectedness is given in lemma A1 in the Appendix. 4 Another way to get reassurance about the connectedness restriction is by way of a description of the set of allocations that are implementable, but not connected. They tend to be allocations which do not make full use of the set of possible money holdings. For example, for B = 2, any non-connected allocation can be achieved with B = 1 and two distinct monies (see Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright [1] for examples of such allocations).
to trade one unit of money. That is:
Next, I use G (p;¹) to de…ne a correspondence ¥ (p;¹) on the set of money holdings of producers, I´f0; :::; B ¡ 1g, which gives the post-trade holdings of consumers implied by G (p;¹) . That is:
, which is a permutation with a unique orbit. 6 Finally, block I ln is said to be reachable from I lm if it is possible to …nd a sequence of blocks fI l s g m¡1 s=n such that I l s \ I l s+1 6 = ; for all s = n; :::; m ¡ 1. I can now give the following de…nition: Before I turn to the next section, I would like to introduce some additional notation which is used later. If (p; ¹) is implementable and connected, then there are participation constraints implied by both actual trades in meetings and by willingness to trade one unit of money. In particular, implementability implies that if the probability of a transfer of k units of money in a meeting of a producer with i and a consumer with j units, p i p j¸k ij ; is positive, then the participation constraints (5) have to hold for every y in the support of conditional measure ¹ k ij . Connectedness implies that another group of 5 Note that ¥
Let ¾ : A ! A be a permutation and let R be an equivalence relation on A such that a n Ra m if and only if there exists an integer l such that a m = ¾ l (a n ). Then an orbit of ¾ is an equivalence class of relation R. Note that an arbitrary permutation can have more than one orbit. However, if a permutation has a unique orbit, this orbit necessarily coincides with the set A.
participation constraints holds for some y in every meeting where agents are willing to trade one unit of money. Therefore, it is convenient to de…ne the following objects: 
hold for all (i; j; k) 2 Z (p;¹) . I now concentrate on the optimum problem P 0 , which is to maximize welfare W subject to (p; ¹) being implementable and connected.
Characterization of the optima
In this section I show that any solution to problem P 0 has degenerate measures ¹ k ij . Most proofs are in the Appendix. First I use connectedness to show that P 0 has solutions. This is done by endowing the space of measures ¹ k ij with the weak* topology and by showing that the set of implementable and connected allocations is compact and that the objective W is continuous. are autarkic.) Note that autarky is de…ned as no production rather than no trade. The perturbations adjust measure ¹ k ij , but do not a¤ect¸k ij and, hence, the distribution p.
Let ¹ be a nondegenerate probability measure on R + with a bounded support and let y and y be the endpoints of that support. Let us take six nonnegative numbers: a, b, c, d, x and " such that b¸a + ¹. Then the perturbation does two things. First, it moves the endpoints y and y of ¹ 1 and ¹ 2 independently to the new positions, a and b for ¹ 1 and c and d for ¹ 2 , so that the "shapes" of ¹ 1 and ¹ 2 (which are those of ¹) are preserved. Second, the perturbation creates a mass point x with mass " within the union of the perturbed supports. That is, the perturbed measure e ¹ is obtained from ¹ via the formula:
where ± x is a Dirac measure with support x, and t 1 and t 2 are two linear mappings on the real line de…ned by my requirement that t 1 maps y and y into a and b and that t 2 maps y and y into c and d. 7 Note that because I set b > a and d > c, the mappings t 1 and t 2 are invertible.
For a measure ¹ which is degenerate, the perturbation splits its singlepoint support into two points which, however, are allowed to be the same. Each of these points gets one-half of the mass of measure ¹. That is, let g and h be two nonnegative numbers. Then the perturbed measure e ¹ is given by
7 That is, t 1 (y; a; b) = ay ¡ by y ¡ y + b ¡ a y ¡ y y and analogously for t 2 :
Now, given an arbitrary implementable and connected allocation (p; ¹), I de…ne a …nite-dimensional optimization problem, denoted e P (p;¹) , which is to maximize W by the choice of the parameters (a
, one eight-tuple for each nonempty non-autarkic measure ¹ k ij in ¹, subject to (p; e ¹) being implementable and connected. If (p; ¹) solves P 0 , then the null perturbation must solve e P (p;¹) . This is the basis for the proof by contradiction showing that every nonempty non-autarkic measure ¹ k ij in ¹ must be degenerate.
Because this optimization problem is …nite-dimensional, it can be analyzed by means of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. The central hypothesis of that theorem is the constraint quali…cation: the rank of the Jacobian matrix should be equal to the number of active constraints. The constraint quali…cation is su¢cient to ensure the existence of an open region U adjacent to the solution point in which all the constraints are relaxed. Existence of such a region allows one to claim that the solution point satis…es the …rst-order necessary conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. My approach is to establish existence of U directly, without appeal to the full rank requirement on the Jacobian matrix. Lemma 1. Let (p; ¹) be a non-autarkic solution to problem P 0 . Let e P ¤ (p;¹) be the associated perturbation problem e P (p;¹) with the additional restriction that " k ij´0 . Let E be the set of all active constraints of problem e P ¤ (p;¹) at (p; ¹) and assume that E is nonempty. Then there exists a nonempty subset E 0 of E and multipliers » s¸0 , one for each constraint in E 0 , such that the gradient of the objective W can be written as a linear combination of the gradients of the constraints in E 0 .
The proof of the lemma has two major parts. First, connectedness is used to show that any implementable and connected allocation is either autarky or satis…es y k ij > 0 for all (i; j; k) 2 Z (p;¹) . Because I consider non-autarkic solutions to P 0 , the latter implies that all the constraints in problem e P ¤ (p;¹)
pertaining to non-negativity of endpoints are slack. Second, the participation constraints implied by implementability and connectedness are used to show existence of a …xed vector n in the space of perturbations such that the angle between this vector and the gradient of any of the participation constraints is less than
. These two facts are su¢cient to guarantee existence of U. That, in turn, implies that the gradient of W is in the convex hull of the gradients of the active constraints whose edges de…ne E 0 : The multipliers » s of lemma 1 can be used to prove the main proposition. Proof. Suppose that (p; ¹) is a solution to the optimum problem P 0 and that it has at least one nondegenerate measure ¹ k ij : Consider the associated perturbation problem e P (p;¹) and let E be the set of active participation constraints of that problem. Let us …rst assume that E is nonempty.
By lemma 1, (p; ¹) satis…es necessary …rst order conditions for the KuhnTucker theorem for that problem. The constraints are the participation constraints in E 0 and "
At " k ij = 0, the multipliers associated with x k ij are equal to zero. Therefore, the multiplier associated with the binding constraint, " k ij = 0, can be expressed as
where » s 1 and » s 2 are the multipliers from lemma 1.
Note that optimality of "
which, because ¹ k ij is nondegenerate, is an interval. It follows from (9) that:
where i . If E is empty, then all the participation constraints are slack which implies that the multipliers associated with these constraints are zeros. Then ©(y) = z(y) and the above argument applies. ¥ Note that the proof of proposition 2 applies to any non-autarkic solution to problem P 0 . Recall that autarky is an allocation where all nonempty measures ¹ k ij have zero supports and, thus, is degenerate. This means that proposition 2 holds for all possible solutions to problem P 0 . However, if proposition 2 is to be of interest, it better be that there is a wide class of environments where these solutions are non-autarkic. It is easy to provide conditions for existence of non-autarkic implementable allocations. These exist if c
8 Then if, as was argued above, connectedness is an innocuous restriction for problem P , then this condition is also su¢cient for existence of non-autarkic solutions to problem P 0 .
Concluding remarks
Proposition 2 states that the optimum chosen from among allocations which are implementable and connected does not involve randomization over output conditional on the transfer of money in a meeting. Because my proof technique is compatible with the money creation scheme studied in [2] , the result can be used to study optimal money creation. In particular, it can form the basis for computing optima for examples.
A Appendix
Lemma A1. If (p; ¹) is implementable and is such that (i) p has full support and the associated value function v is concave and (ii)¸k ij > 0 for some k¸1 in all meetings in which j¸i, where j is money holdings of the consumer and i those of the producer, then (p; ¹) is connected.
Proof. First, I show that concavity of the value function implies that trade in a meeting implies willingness to trade one unit in that meeting. Because (p; ¹) is implementable and p has full support,¸k ij > 0 implies that there exists y¸0 such that
where in each display the second inequality follows from implementability. The outer inequalities imply willingness to trade y k for one unit of money. Therefore, by hypothesis (ii) of the lemma, G (p;¹) contains all pairs of money holdings (i; j) with j¸i. Now for each i 2 f1; :::; B ¡ 1g consider the set I i´f i ¡ 1; ig. This is a block because j = i + 1 and j = i satisfy j¸i and because the associated permutation,
has a unique orbit. Finally, these blocks are mutually reachable and jointly cover the set f0; :::; B ¡ 1g of money holdings of producers. ¥ Proposition 1. The optimum problem P 0 has solutions.
Proof. Because each of the spaces of probability measures ¹ ij on R + £ K ij is endowed with the weak* topology, continuity of the objective W is vacuous. To complete the proof of proposition 1, I need to show that the set of implementable and connected allocations, ¡, is nonempty and compact.
To see that ¡ is nonempty, observe that autarky is always in ¡. The fact that supp ¹ k ij = f0g for all nonempty measures ¹ k ij in ¹ implies that the associated value function, v, is zero and money has no value. Then, because y = 0 satis…es participation constraints for all i, j, k, autarky is implementable and connected.
To demonstrate compact valuedness of ¡, it su¢ces to show that ¡ is closed valued and that all of the supports of measures ¹ k ij are bounded 9 . Consider a converging net of implementable and connected allocations, (p; ¹) r , and let (p; ¹) be its limit. The choice of the topology implies that p r ! p and ¡¸k ij ¢ r !¸k ij for all i, j, k. This and continuity of the function g(p;¸)ṕ T ¡ p imply that pT = p and the limiting distribution p is stationary.
To show that the limit (p; ¹) is implementable and connected, let us …rst consider all converging nets (p; ¹) r such that starting from some r, Z (p;¹)r is a constant set, denoted Z. Then, because supp ¹ Because for every r, Z (p;¹)r is a subset of f0; :::; B ¡ 1g £ f1; :::; Bg 2 , which is …nite, there exists some set Z and a subnet (p; ¹) rs with the property that Z (p;¹)r s = Z. Then, because a net converges if and only if every subnet converges to the same limit, (p; ¹), the constancy of Z (p;¹)r is without loss of generality.
To demonstrate boundedness of supports, let us consider an arbitrary block I l and write down incentive compatibility constraints (8), which pertain to selection ¾ l (p;¹) from ¥ (p;¹) :
is a permutation and selection from ¥ (p;¹) , for each j, which shows up in the above collection of the participation constraints, it is possible to …nd a unique i such that j ¡1 = ¾ l (p;¹) (i). Adding up separately producer and consumer constraints and taking the latter into account, one obtains:
Because ¾ l (p;¹) is a permutation, the two sums of gains from trades in (11) are equal, which yields:
Note that by de…nition, y k ij · y k ij , which, together with the properties of utility and cost functions, yields:
all i 2 I l , where y ¤ is a unique solution to u 0 (y) = c 0 (y) and jI l j, jI l j · B, is the size of block I l . Then properties of u(y) and c(y) guarantee that y 1 ij is …nite for all i 2 I l and, because I l is arbitrary, all supports that correspond to transfer of one unit and are a part of some ¾ . Let E be the set of all active constraints of problem e P ¤ (p;¹) at (p; ¹) and assume that E is nonempty. Then there exists a nonempty subset E 0 of E and multipliers » s¸0 , one for each constraint in E 0 , such that the gradient of the objective W can be written as a linear combination of the gradients of the constraints in E 0 .
Proof. By assumption, (p; ¹) is non-autarkic, implementable and connected. I …rst show that y k ij > 0 for all (i; j; k) 2 Z (p;¹) . Suppose to the contrary, that there exists a triplet (i; j; k) 2 Z (p;¹) such that y k ij = 0. By (8), it follows that in this case v j ¡v j¡k = 0; which implies that v j ¡v j¡1 = 0. Because (p; ¹) is connected, there exists a block, I l , such that j ¡ 1 2 I l . Then v j ¡ v j¡1 = 0 implies that y Obviously, l g = l h = 1 satis…es this equation. Thus, we have the vector n whose inner product with the gradients of the constraints in problem e P ¤ (p;¹) is positive. Because the objective and constraints are continuously di¤erentiable, existence of n is equivalent to existence of an open region U in the space of perturbations where all the constraints in (8) are relaxed. Because (p; ¹) solves P 0 , it follows that the gradient of the objective is in the convex hull of the gradients of the active constraints. Finally, because the number of constraints in (8) does not exceed the number of degrees of freedom provided by perturbations, the edges of that convex hull are linearly independent. ¥
